Introduction
The existence of the value for stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a class of stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions, is proved in [2] . Here we use essentially the same tools to derive the existence of the minmax and maxmin for n-player stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a corresponding class of n-person stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions.
The set of states of the stochastic game Γ is denoted S, the set of actions of player i ∈ I at state z ∈ S is A i (z), and the stage payoff and the transition probability as a function of the state z and the action profile a ∈ × i∈I A i (z) are denoted r(z, a) and p ( · | z, a), respectively. The vector payoff at stage t, r(z t , a t ) = (r i (z t , a t )) i∈I , is denoted x t ; note that x t can be viewed as a function that is defined on the measurable space of infinite plays (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t , . . . ). If Γ is a two-player zero-sum stochastic game we write x t for x 1 t . A strategy profile σ together with an initial state z 1 ∈ S induces a probability distribution on the (measurable) space of plays. The expectation w.r.t. this probability distribution is denoted by E z 1 σ or E σ for short. 1 
Definitions of the Value and the Minmax
First recall the definition of the value, minmax, and maxmin. We say that v(z) is the value of a two-person zero-sum stochastic game Γ with initial state
1) For every ε > 0 there is an ε-optimal strategy σ of player 1, i.e., a strategy σ of player 1, such that: there is a positive integer N (N = N (ε, σ)) such that for every strategy τ of player 2 and every n ≥ N we have 
We say that v of players I \ {i} we have such that for every n ≥ N we have
In the above definitions of the value (minmax and maxmin, respectively) of the stochastic games with initial state z 1 the positive integer N may obviously depend on the state z 1 . When N does not depend on the initial state we say that the stochastic game has a value (a minmax and a maxmin, respectively). Formally, the stochastic game has a value if there exists a
where σ, σ ε (respectively, τ, τ ε ) stands for strategies of player 1 (respectively, strategies of player 2).
Similarly, the stochastic game has a minmax of player i if there is a functionv i : S → IR such that:
There are several weaker concepts of value, minmax and maxmin.
The Limiting Average Value
The limiting average value (of the stochastic game with initial state z 1 ) exists
A related but weaker concept of a value is the limsup value. The limsup value (of the stochastic game with initial state z 1 ) exists and equals v (z 1 )
The Uniform Value
The uniform value of the stochastic game with initial state z 1 exists and
The stochastic game has a uniform value if there is a function u :
Analogous requirements define the limiting average minmax and maxmin, the limsup minmax and maxmin, and the uniform minmax and maxmin.
In a given two-player zero-sum stochastic game (1) existence of the value is equivalent to the existence of both the maxmin and the minmax, and their equality, (2) existence of the uniform value is equivalent to the existence of both the the uniform maxmin and the uniform minmax, and their equality, and (3) existence of the limiting average value is equivalent to the existence of both the limiting average maxmin and the limiting average minmax, and their equality. 7
Examples
The following example highlights the role of the set of inequalities used in the above definitions, and illustrates the differences of the various value concepts.
Consider the following example of a single-player stochastic game Γ with infinitely many states and finitely many actions: the state space S is the set of integers; at state 0 the player has two actions called − and + and in all other states the player has a single action (i.e., no choice); the payoff function depends only on the state. The payoff function r is given by: r(k) = 1 if
n > 1 is odd; in all other cases r(k) = 0. The transition is deterministic;
The stochastic game Γ can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game where player 2 has no choices. Section 2 discusses the candidate for the value. In Section 3 we present a basic probabilistic lemma which serves as the driving engine for the results to follow. Section 4 introduces constrained stochastic games and uses the basic probabilistic lemma to prove the existence of a value (of two-player zero-sum stochastic games) as well as the existence of the maxmin and the minmax (of n-player stochastic games).
The Candidate for the Value
Existence of the value v implies that the limit (as n → ∞) of v n , the (normalized) values of the n stage games, exists and equals v, and moreover the limit (as λ → 0+) of v λ , the (normalized) value of the λ-discounted games, exists and equals v.
Therefore, the only candidate for the value v is the limit of the values v n as n → ∞, which equals the limit of the values of the λ-discounted games v λ as λ → 0+.
Assume first that every stochastic game with finitely many states and actions indeed has a value (and thus in particular a uniform value). Denote by v(z 1 ) the value as a function of the initial state z 1 . Note that if σ is an ε-optimal strategy of player 1 in Γ ∞ then it must satisfy
for every strategy τ of player 2 and every positive integer n. Otherwise, there is a strategy τ of player 2 and a positive integer n such that
Let τ be an ε 1 -optimal strategy of player 2. Consider the strategy τ of player 2 that coincides with τ in stages 1, . . . , n and with τ thereafter,
It follows that for k sufficiently large E σ,τ
contradicts the ε-optimality of σ.
The ε appearing in inequality (5) is essential. It is impossible to find for every two-person zero-sum stochastic game an ε-optimal strategy σ of player and every n we have E σ,τ
The variable v(z n ) represents the potential for payoffs starting at stage n. The above discussion shows that targeting the future potentials alone is necessary but insufficient; the player also has to reckon with the stream of payoffs (x n ) ∞ n=1 . Therefore, in addition to securing the future potential, player 1's ε-optimal strategy has to correlate the stream of payoffs (
to the stream of future potentials (v(z n ))
The constructed ε-optimal strategies σ ε of player 1 will thus guarantee in addition that for sufficiently large n,
which together with inequality (5) guarantees that
The delicate point of the contraction of ε-optimal strategies is thus to find a strategy σ that guarantees both (5) and (6). We anchor the construction on the following inequality that holds for any behavioral strategy of player 1 that plays at stage i the optimal mixed action of the λ i -discounted stochastic game:
where H i is the σ-algebra generated by the sequence z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z i of states and actions up to the play at stage i. Moreover, player 1 can guarantee these inequalities to hold also for a sequence of discount rates λ i that depends on
in (7) is a weighted average of the stage payoff x i and an approximation
Note that inequality (7) states that the conditional expectations of this weighted average is larger than an ap-
In proving the existence of the minmax (of an I-player stochastic game with finitely many players, states and actions) we first define for every λ > 0 the functionsv
where the first min is over all I \ {i}-tuples of strategies σ and a sequence of discount rates (λ t ) ∞ t=1 such that λ t is measurable w.r.t. the algebras H t and such that if σ is a strategy profile such that for every t ≥ 1
we have
then for every n ≥ N inequalities (1) and (2) Similarly, for every ε > 0 there is a positive integer N = N (ε) and a sequence of discount rates (λ t ) ∞ t=1 such that λ t is measurable w.r.t. the H t and such that if σ is a strategy profile such that for every t ≥ 1 we have
then for every n ≥ N inequalities (3) and (4) 
The Basic Lemma
The next lemma is stated as a lemma on stochastic processes. The statement of the lemma is essentially a reformulation of an implicit result in [2] and its proof is essentially identical to the proof there. Without needing to repeat and replicate the proof, the reformulation enables us to use an implicit result of [2] in various other applications, like (1) the present existence of the minmax in an n-player stochastic game, (2) the existence of the minmax of two-player stochastic games with imperfect monitoring [1] , [4] , [5] , and (3) the existence of an extensive-form correlated equilibrium in n-player stochastic games [6] .
We use symbols and notations that indicate its applicability to stochas- 
In the case that v t,λ (ω) is either the λ-discounted value of a two-player zero-sum stochastic game or the minmax (or maxmin) of player i of the λ-discounted stochastic game it is actually a function of the two variables λ and z t (which depends obviously on ω and t). Whenever the stochastic game has finitely many states and actions, each one of the (finitely many)
is a bounded semi-algebraic function. Therefore, the set of functions λ → v t,λ (ω), where t and ω range over all positive integers t and all points ω ∈ Ω, is a finite set of bounded real-valued semi-algebraic functions. In that case, the assumption and conclusion (a) of Lemma 1 hold.
Indeed, it follows (see, e.g., [3] ) that there is a constant 0 < θ < 1 and finitely
where m is a positive integer, such that for every t and ω there is j ∈ J such that for 0 
Indeed, define inductively q 1 = M and q k+1 = q k + 3L(q k ). It follows from
which by (13) (and using the inequality δ < 1/4) is ≤ δ/2.
is a Cauchy sequence and thus it converges to a limit, v n, ∞ , and
Given s ≥ M , let k be the largest positive integer such that q k ≤ s.
It follows that s = q k + θL(q k ) with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 3, and thus, using (12),
(moreover, the convergence is uniform) and |v n,λ(s) − v n,∞ | ≤ δ for every
Recall that the above step is redundant in the special case where the set of functions λ → v n, λ (ω), 0 < λ ≤ 1, where n and ω range over all positive integers and all points ω ∈ Ω, constitute a finite set of bounded semi-algebraic functions.
We now continue with the proof. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small (ε < 1/2) and set δ = ε/12. As λ is strictly decreasing and integrable by (13), lim s→∞ sλ(s) = 0; hence by (10) it follows that lim s→∞ λ(s)L(s) = 0 and therefore by choosing M sufficiently large
Define inductively, starting with s 0 ≥ M :
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. Let P be a distribution on Ω such that for every j ≥ 1,
In order to simplify the notation in the computations below we denote
We will prove that (Y k )
∞ k=0 is a submartingale adapted to the increasing sequence of σ-fields (F k ) ∞ k=0 , and moreover that
Note 
,α k ) and we bound the
The assumption that the functions r i, λ and v n, λ are [−1, 1]-valued and that ε < 1/2 imply that |r i,λ | + |v n,λ | + 2ε < 3. Therefore, for every k, there is |θ| ≤ 3 such that s k+1 − s k = θL k . Therefore,
and it follows from (12) that
Fix k ≥ 1 and let g i = r B k +i,α k and
conditional expectations (with respect to F k ) of the inequalities (19) for 
Summing the above inequalities over 0 ≤ i < L k we have
therefore we have (21) and (11)), we deduce that
which proves (20).
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The random variables Y k − Y j are bounded by 3. Therefore,
Hence, by the monotone convergence theorem, 
Summing the above inequalities over k ≤ k and rearranging the terms we
Hence, for any n we have
Note that s k ≤ s 0 + 3B k for every k, and thus
Therefore, using also (23) and the bound B k(n) − n ≤ (δ/4)s 0 + δn, we have
Since for sufficiently large k we have 3δ + 
is a behavioral strategy σ such that for every finite history z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t we
The λ-discounted minmax (of player 1) in the X-constrained stochastic game,w
where the supremum is over all X 1 -constrained strategies σ of player 1 and the infimum is over all X 2 -constrained strategies τ of player 2.
Similarly, the λ-discounted maxmin (of player 1) in the X-constrained
, is defined by
For every 0 < λ < 1 we consider the system of equations
in the variable w(z), z ∈ S, and where the sup is over all x ∈ X 1 (z) and the inf is over all y ∈ X 2 (z). The system of equations depends on the data S, A, r, p . As we show below, its solution w λ ∈ IR S turns out to be the λ-discounted maxmin of player 1.
We use the classical contraction argument to show that the system (26) has a unique solution: for every 0 < λ < 1 the map T : 
where λ t also stands for λ t (h) for short, and thus for every X 2 -constrained strategy τ of player 2 we have 
and thus
In particular, if λ t = λ is a constant discount rate, it follows (by multiplying the inequalities (27) 
is the λ-discounted maxmin of the constrained stochastic game.
We prove the existence of the minmax and maxmin under the additional assumption that the constrained sets X 
(b) For every ε > 0 there is n 0 sufficiently large such that for every X 
the following inequalities hold:
for every (X 2 (z)) z∈S -constrained strategy τ of player 2, 
the following inequalities hold: Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small (e.g., ε < 3) and set δ = ε/12. Set r n,λ = r(z n , a n ).
By the basic probabilistic lemma there is for every λ 0 > 0 a sufficiently large positive integer n 0 and a sequence λ t with 0 < λ t < λ 0 such that λ t is measurable w.r.t. H t and such that for every probability P on (Ω, H ∞ ) with
inequalities (14), (15), and (16) hold; i.e., we have
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Fix such a sequence (λ t )
. By the definition of w λ there is a strategy σ of player 1 such that for every history h = (z 1 , . . . , z t ) and every mixed action
Therefore, for every X
2
-constrained strategy τ of player 2 we have
and thus inequalities (29), (30), and (31) hold.
Similarly, by the basic probabilistic lemma there is for every λ 0 > 0 a sufficiently large positive integer n 0 and a sequence (λ t ) ∞ t=1 with 0 < λ t < λ 0 such that λ t is measurable w.r.t. H t and such that for every probability P on (Ω, H ∞ ) with
we have -ε-N -maximizing strategy.
The conclusions of Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 also apply to stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions whenever the payoffs are bounded and the solutions w λ of (26) obey assumption (2) of Lemma 2.
It should be pointed out that throughout this paper we have stressed in addition to the main conclusion a structural property of the established minimaxing (or optimal) strategies. The advantage of the additional structural property is that it can be used to derive various results concerning, e.g., the existence of stationary minimaxing strategies when additional structure, e.g., irreducibility, of the stochastic game is given.
